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CURRENT LEGISLATION
AMENDMENT OF THE CIVIL PRACTICE ACT RELATING TO THE
AWARDING OF A VENDEE'S LIEN UPON HIS RESCISSION OF THE
CONTRACT.-A vendee of land, having made a down payment on the
purchase price and thereafter discovering that the contract had been
induced by fraud or by a material mistake of fact, was unable to
rescind the contract in equity, if he wished to be awarded a lien in
the land as a security for the repayment of the advancements made.1
If, however, he had rescinded by self-help and then sued at law for
money had and received, he would in equity have been entitled to a
lien.2 Such was the state of the law in New York before March 10,
1947; for on that day Section 112-h 3 of the Civil Practice Act be-
came effective, and New York joined the ranks of those jurisdic-
tions which granted a vendee's lien whenever the vendee petitions
for one irrespective of the remedy requested by him.4
In arriving at this singular conclusion, the Court of Appeals
took a narrow view not only of the remedy of rescission but also of
the vendee's lien. Rescission has as its primary purpose the reliev-
ing of the defrauded or mistaken party of an onerous burden which
he would not have assumed if the facts had been as they finally ap-
peared to be.5 This result is reached by returning the parties as far
as possible to the status quo ante, and in doing so acting as if the
contract had never been entered into.6 The law on the other hand,
not to be 'Outstripped by equity, reached the same result by permit-
1 Flickenger v. Glass, 222 N. Y. 404, 118 N. E. 792 (1918); Davis v.
Rosenzweig Realty Co., 192 N. Y. 128, 84 N. E. 943 (1908).
2 Elterman v. Hyman, 192 N. Y. 113, 84 N. E. 937 (1908); Garrett v.
Cohen, 63 Misc. 450, 117 N. Y. Supp. 129 (Sup. Ct. 1909).
3 N. Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT § 112-h. Vendee's lien not to depend upon form
of action. When relief is sought in an action or proceeding or by way of de-
fense or counterclaim, by a vendee under an agreement for the sale or ex-
change of real property, because of the failure, invalidity, disaffirmance or
rescission of such agreement, a vendee's lien upon the property shall not be
denied merely because the claim for relief is for rescission, or is based upon
the rescission, failure, invalidity, or disaffirmance of such agreement.
4Tudor v. Raudebaugh, 278 Fed. 254 (D. C. Mont 1922) (rescission);
Aday v. Echols, 18 Ala. 353, 52 Am. Dec. 225 (1850) (as a counterclaim to
an action for specific performance); Montgomery v. Meyerstein, 186 Cal. 459,
199 Pac. 800 (1921) (rescission); Wolfinger v. Thomas, 22 S. D. 57, 115 N. W.
100 (1908) (rescission); Delano v. Saylor, 113 S. W. 888 (Ky. 1908) (de-
fective title); Gayle v. Troutman, 31 Ky. L. R. 718, 103 S. W. 342 (1907)(rescission); Larson v. Metcalf, 201 Iowa 1208, 207 N. W. 382 (1926)(rescission); Goldstein v. Ehrlick, 96 N. J. Eq. 52 124 Atl. 761 (1924) (defect
in title); Cleveland v. Bergen Bldg. & Imp. Co., 55 Atl. 117 (N. J. Eq. 1903).
r WIsrox, CoNn ACrs, § 1455 (rev. ed. 1937).6 Dooley v. Stillson, 46 R. I. 332, 128 AtI. 217, 218 (1925).
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ting the injured party to rescind by self-help, i.e., a one-sided dis-
affirmance, and thereafter sue at law for money had and received.
7
As can readily be seen the result attained is identical, in spite of the
different means used to attain the end.
Equity, in addition to its remedy of rescission, sought to relieve
the injured party, who in reliance upon a contract has paid part of
the consideration required and who through no fault of his own has
been unable to receive what he bargained for, by giving him a lien
on the land equivalent to his monetary outlay." A lien, as inter-
preted by the courts, "is a charge upon property which exists in
favor of a person to whom another owes a debt or duty." 9 The
majority of the courts award the lien, which has been recognized
since the time of Blackstone,'0 through their application of either the
trust theory 11 or on purely equitable principles to prevent unjust
enrichment.1 2  Under the trust theory, the courts of equity merely
extended their policy of regarding the vendee of land as the owner,
even though the vendor still held the legal title. As the vendee's
equity increased through his payment of the purchase price, more
and more land was held in trust for him by the vendor, and when
the whole purchase price had been paid, equitable conversion was
completed and the legal title was only an empty right, for in equity
the vendee could at any time after the law date compel the vendor
to convey it to him.13 Where, however, the vendee did not wish
to accept title because of its unmarketable 14 or defective character,' 5
or where the contract had been induced by fraud or mistake, 16 the
vendee was entitled to the return of his money together with the in-
terest earned from the time of the discovery of the fraud 17 or the
date of default.' 8 Since the vendor might have dissipated the funds
and might have become financially irresponsible, the court would
7 Cory v. Freeholders of. Somerset, 47 N. J. L. 181 (1885).
8 First Savings Bank of Albany v. Linnhaven Orchard Co., 89 Ore. 354,
174 Pac. 614 (1918).
9 Marshall v. C. S. Young Const. Co., 94 Fla. 11, 113 So. 565, 566 (1927).
10 Burgess v. Wheate, 1 Win. Blacks. 123, 96 Eng. Rep. 67 (1759).
11 See Gray, J., dissenting in Davis v. Rosenzweig Realty Co., 192 N. Y.
128, 139, 84 N. E. 943, 945 (1908).
12 Whitbread & Co., Ltd. v. Watt, [1902] 1 Ch. 835.
13 Jennison v. Leonard, 21 Wall. (U. S.) 302, 22 L. ed. 539 (1874); see
Gray, J., dissenting in Davis v. Rosenzweig Realty Co., 192 N. Y. 128, 139,
84 N. E. 943, 945 (1908).
24 Wetmore v. Bruce, 118 N. Y. 319, 23 N. E. 303 (1890); Feldblum v.
Laurelton Land Co., 151 App. Div. 24, 135 N. Y. Supp. 349 (1st Dep't 1912).
15 Delano v. Saylor, 113 S. W. 888 (Ky. 1908); Goldstein v. Ehrlick, 96
N. J. Eq. 52, 125 Atl. 761 (1924).
16 Montgomery v. Meyerstein. 186 Cal. 459. 199 Pac. 800 (1921); Witte
v. Hobolth, 224 Mich. 286, 195 N. W. 82 (1923).
17 Griffith v. Depew, 3 A. K. Marsh. 177, 13 Am. Dec. 141 (Ky. 1820).
18 Everett v. Mansfield, 148 Fed. 374 (C. C. A. 1st 1906).
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permit the vendee to have the original land sold to satisfy the obli-
gation of the vendor 11 or if he preferred, he could remain in posses-
sion of the land until paid.20
In spite of the logic behind this reasoning, New York turned
its back on the trust theory and maintained that the vendee's lien
was one of the rights arising out of the contract of sale.21  In the
logical application of this theory, the court inevitably was compelled
to hold that where the vendee came into a court of equity praying
for rescission of the burdensome contract, he could not be the recipi-
ent of the vendee's lien, for by his choice of action and of remedy
he was of necessity alleging that no contract had ever existed,22 and
a fortiori rights which could arise only from a contract could not
arise from a nullity.23 Therefore, unless the vendee actually sued
for the vendee's lien or counterclaimed for one, he would only re-
ceive a judgment for the money debt, no security to insure its sat-
isfaction being awarded. The result of this arbitrary holding was
that the vendee affirmed the contract no matter how much fraud was
involved and sued to recover a lien on the land as well as the down
payment, for then only did he receive the complete relief to which
he was entitled.
Where the vendee's lien is granted, the court includes within
its scope all monies paid under the terms of the contract, 24 interest
on the purchase price,23 together with money expended for improve-
ments and taxes,26 but it does not include money spent in the title
search,28 nor for attorney's fees, 29 nor for loss in profit through the
failure to make a subsequent resale of the land,3 0 for these latter
expenses were not stipulated for in the contract of sale. No posses-
sion of the land, constituting the subject matter of the contract of
sale, need be shown today, although formerly the vendee needed this
19Tudor v. Raudebaugh, 278 Fed. 254 (D. C. Mont. 1922); FRY, SPEcIFIc
PERFORMANCE, § 1176 (6th ed. 1921).
20 Griffith v. Depew, 3 A. K. Marsh. 177, 13 Am. Dec. 141 (Ky. 1820).
21Elterman v. Hyman, 192 N. Y. 113, 84 N. E. 937 (1908); Davis v.
Rosenzweig Realty Co., 192 N. Y. 128, 84 N. E. 943 (1908); Flickenger v.
Glass, 222 N. Y. 404, 118 N. E. 792 (1918).
22 Davis v. Rosenzweig Realty Co., 192 N. Y. 128, 84 N. E. 943 (1908);
Garrett v. Cohen, 63 Misc. 450, 117 N. Y. Supp. 129 (Sup. Ct. 1909).2 3 Diven v. Ashbaugh, 121 Misc. 213, 200 N. Y. Supp. 634 (Sup. Ct. 1923).
24 CAL. CIV. CODE (Deering, 1937) § 3050; Montgomery v. Meyerstein,
186 Cal. 459, 199 Pac. 800 (1921); Coleman v. Floyd, 131 Ind. 330, 31 N. E.
75 (1892) ; Craft v. Latourette, 62 N. J. Eq. 206, 49 Atl. 711 (1901).
25 Wolfinger v. Thomas, 22 S. D. 57, 115 N. W. 100 (1908).
28 Aday v. Echols, 18 Ala. 353, 52 Am. Dec. 225 (1850); Gibert v. Peteler,
38 N. Y. 165, 97 Am. Dec. 785 (1868).
27 Montgomery v. Meyerstein, 186 Cal. 459, 199 Pac. 800 (1921).
28 Occidental Realty Co. v. Palmer, 117 App. Div. 505, 102 N. Y. Supp.
648 (1st Dep't 1907), aff'd inemr., 192 N. Y. 588, 85 N. E. 1113 (1908).29 Ungrich v. Shaff, 119 App. Div. 843, 105 N. Y. Supp. 1013 (1st Dep't
1907).
3 Holden v. Efficient Craftsman Corp., 234 N. Y. 437, 138 N. E. 85(1923).
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additional equity,31 for the payment of the money pursuant to the
contract gives the vendee the right to a lien.3 2 As has become ap-
parent, the vendee is permitted to have his lien only to the extent
of his actual expenditures; therefore, he is not accorded one covering
the value of those improvements which were on the land when he
entered into possession. Since they had always belonged to the ven-
dor, the court does not favor a result which would compel the vendor
to pay twice for his property, once for its construction and again to
the vendee as damages. 83 The court of equity does not penalize the
vendor, beyond returning to the vendee those rights which he sur-
rendered in reliance upon performance of the contract, and to whose
return he became entitled upon the vendor's default. In line with
this policy, the vendee has never been the recipient of the lien where
he was the defaulting party, nor where the vendor's failure to per-
form was attributable to the vendee's prior default.34 Therefore, the
granting of the lien is not inconsistent with the remedy of rescission,
for equity would only be giving an additional proof of its ability to
give the fullest relief possible.
The new amendment to the laws of New York has abolished the
old distinctions between the remedies available to the vendee, where
the vendor was in default. It will therefore be immaterial whether
the vendor had an unmarketable title, or owned less land than he
had contracted to sell, or had committed fraud, for in all instances
the vendee, unless he was the cause of the default, may receive a lien.
This amendment, therefore, brings New York in line with the
majority. But will New York go as far as other common law juris-
dictions in its application? Some courts have held that the vendee
was entitled to the lien even though he exercised an option given
in the contract to rescind.3 5 This relief was given in spite of the
vendor's not being in active default. The court's departure from the
strict law was made upon the theory of mutuality of remedy, i.e., if
the option had been for the benefit of the vendor, and had been exer-
cised by him, the vendee would, because of the vendor's default, have
been entitled to one, and the court did not incline to deprive the
vendee of the remedy which was only in the nature of security for
the repayment of money, even though the option was for his benefit.36
Whether the New York courts, in their interpretation of Section
31 CAj CIV. CODE (Deering, 1937) § 3050; Elterman v. Hyman, 192 N. Y.
113, 84 N. E. 937 (1908); Occidental Realty Co. v. Palmer, 117 App. Div.
505, 102 N. Y. Supp. 648 (1st Dep't 1907), aff'd mem., 192 N. Y. 588, 85
N. E. 1113 (1908).
32 Elterman v. Hyman, 192 N. Y. 113, 84 N. E. 937 (1908).
33 Merrill v. Merrill, 103 Cal. 287, 35 Pac. 768 (1894), aff'd, 103 Cal. 287,
37 Pac. 392 (1894).
34 Griffith v. Depew, 3 A. K. Marsh. 177, 13 Am. Dec. 141 (Ky. 1820).
35 Whitbread & Co., Ltd. v. Watt, [1902] 1 Ch. 835; Wilson v. Sunnyside
Orchard Co., 33 Id. 501, 196 Pac. 302 (1921).
36 Whitbread & Co., Ltd. v. Watt, [1902] 1 Ch. 835.
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112-h of the Civil Practice Act, will follow this holding has yet to
be seen, as the statute makes no provision for this eventuality. It is
submitted that there appears to be no reason for not granting the
vendee's lien, where he exercised the right of rescission given him
in the contract. Since the parties successfully bargained for the right
to rescind, the statute, which has as its aim the enlargement of the
remedy's scope, should not be narrowly construed.
In another aspect the statute has not altered the common law,
namely where the vendor purported to sell land to which he had no
title. By definition, the lien is a mere right, through the medium of
the court, to charge the land. It is not a title to or an estate in the
land, neither a jus in re nor a jus in ren.37  Therefore, if the ven-
dor's default consisted in agreeing to sell land to which he had no
title, the court can not give the vendee a lien for there is no land
to which it could attach.38 This set of facts would prevent the court
from giving complete relief, and the obstacle exists irrespective of
the remedy sought by the vendee. By necessity, since the lien is
given as security for the down payment it can attach only to the
specific land contracted for and not to other parcels owned by the
vendor.39 In such a situation, therefore, the vendee must of course
be satisfied with a money judgment on which he can later issue
execution.40  Before the passage of this amendment, the court could
attach the vendee's lien to personalty owned by the vendor,41 as long
as the rights of other creditors had not intervened,42 but by the terms
of the new section it may be a charge only on reality.
In accordance with its policy of returning to the vendee those
rights of which he had been wrongfully deprived, the courts have
considered the vendee's lien as paramount to and prevailing over all
purchasers and incumbrancers from the vendor with notice of its
existence.43  Like all equitable rights, it can be defeated only by a
bona fide purchaser for value without notice. Hence, since it has
been held that the lien is in the nature of an equitable mortgage,
44
there should be some provision made for its recording, even though
they are not interests in land. In New York today, liens may be
7 Arnold v. Porter, 122 N. C. 242, 29 S. E. 414, 416 (1898).
38 Robinson v. Campbell, 222 Mich. 111, 192 N. W. 644 (1923).
3 9 See Gray, J., dissenting in Davis v. Rosenzweig Realty Co., 192 N. Y.
128, 139, 84 N. E. 943, 945 (1908); Galbreath v. Reeves, 82 Tex. 357, 18
S. W. 696 (1891).
40 Robinson v. Campbell, 222 Mich. 111, 192 N. W. 644 (1923).
41 Witte v. Hobolth, 224 Mich. 286, 195 N. W. 82 (1923); Giarranto v.
McIlwain, 215 App. Div. 644, 214 N. Y. Supp. 582 (3d Dep't 1926).
42 Giarranto v. McIlwain, 215 App. Div. 644, 214 N. Y. Supp. 582 (3d
Dep't 1926).
43 Larson v. Metcalf, 201 Iowa 1208, 207 N. W. 382 (1926); Lowe v.
Maynard, 115 S. W. 214 (Ky. 1909); First Savings Bank of Albany v. Linn-
haven Orchard Co., 89 Ore. 354, 174 Pac. 614 (1918).
44 Wickman v. Robinson, 14 Wis. 493, 80 Am. Dec. 789 (1861); Elterman
v. Hyman, 192 N. Y. 113, 125, 84 N. E. 937 (1908).
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registered under Section 417 of the Real Property Law,45 but no
case has been decided which holds that the vendee's lien may be re-
corded there, although there appears to be no reason for opposing
its registration. One objection which might be advanced is that the
lien is a part of a judgment and will be docketed as such. But it
is submitted that it will be enforced, not by execution, but by a fore-
closure sale. Although these problems will not affect a vendee in
the usual case where he has become entitled to a lien, they do show
that less than complete relief is occasionally given in a rescission
action.
LENORE BENARIO.
AMENDMENT TO THE CIVIL SERVICE LAW PROHIBITING STRIKES
BY PUBLIC EMPLOYEES.-At the 170th session of the New York
Legislature a bill was enacted amending the Civil Service Law by
inserting, therein, a new section to follow section twenty-two, to be
known as section twenty-two-a. This section declares that a public
employee who strikes loses his civil service protection, and if re-
employed does not regain it for five years. To remove any possi-
bility of profit from his wrongful act, his compensation may not be
increased for three years.'
With the enormous growth and expansion of the labor move-
ment we have had a parallel development of the right to strike, and
as the strength and size of the unions have increased, the right to
strike has gained greater recognition from the courts. It has be-
come increasingly evident that there is a conflict of interests-the
workers' interest in protecting the right to strike as against the gen-
eral interest in the public health, welfare and safety. The necessity
of preserving and insuring our national economy, as the superior
duty of our legislative officers, has stirred them into action both in
the state and national legislatures. One aspect of this great problem
was before the New York Legislature and the solution offered was
the amendment under discussion. It was necessary to distinguish
the public servant from all other workers or employees and to take
the precaution of denying to these employees the right to strike in
order to preserve this general interest in the public health, welfare
and safety.
This addition to the Civil Service Law, i.e., section twenty-two-a,
raises several questions:
1. Does the New York Anti-Injunction Act (C. P. A. 876-a)
apply where the employee is a public employee?
45 Laws of 1916, c. 547, § 11.I N. Y. Cnvu. SvicE LAW § 22a.
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